

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 02987 01 OF 03 141216Z
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 TRSE-00 HA-05 AID-05 OMB-01 CIAE-00
PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01
SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 ACDA-12 /091 W
-----011209 141314Z /10

P R 132140Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 348
INFO AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
DIA WASHDC
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HTS CZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 LA PAZ 2987

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, BL
SUBJECT: BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES DECISION OF APRIL 5 A MAJOR
STEP TOWARDS JULY ELECTIONS: SETS OFF A FLURRY OF POLITICAL
ACTIVITY

REF: LA PAZ 2753

1. SUMMARY. AS WE PIECE TOGETHER THE EVENTS OF THE PAST TWO WEEKS, THE BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES' DECISION OF APRIL 5 (SEE REFTEL) ASSUMES INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE, REFLECTING THE MILITARY'S DETERMINATION TO HOLD ELECTIONS IN JULY 1978 AND STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR JUAN PEREDA'S PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDACY. AT THE SAME TIME THE MILITARY'S DECISION REPRESENTS A SHARP REBUFF TO PRESIDENT BANZER'S EFFORT TO POSTPONE THE ELECTIONS AND TO BANZER PERSONALLY. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT IN THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE ARMED FORCES' MEETING THERE WERE PLANS TO MOUNT A COUP TO PREVENT BANZER FROM PERPETUATING HIMSELF IN POWER, BUT THE PLOTTERS, APPARENTLY AT PEREDA'S URGING, WERE PERSUADED TO WAIT. THE CRUCIAL MOMENT DURING THE ARMED FORCES' MEETING CAME WHEN THE THREE SERVICE COMMANDERS, AT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 02987 01 OF 03 141216Z

BANZER'S BEHEST, TOLD THEIR SUBORDINATES THAT THE ELECTIONS SHOULD BE POSTPONED, AND ASKED THAT THEY STRUCTURE THEIR RECOMMENDATIONS ACCORDINGLY. AFTER HEATED DEBATE THE MORE NUMEROUS COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS VOTED DOWN THE FLAG OFFICERS AND OPTED TO PRESS FORWARD WITH THE CURRENT ELECTORAL PLAN (WHICH WAS PUBLICLY ANNOUNCED) AND TO STRENGTHEN THE PEREDA CANDIDACY (WHICH WAS NOT). DESPITE THE MILITARY'S DECISION,

MANY, INCLUDING PEREDA HIMSELF, BELIEVE BANZER WILL MAKE FURTHER EFFORTS TO POSTPONE THE ELECTIONS. SUCH AN ATTEMPT WOULD BE EXTREMELY RISKY FOR BANZER, AND COULD POSSIBLY TRIGGER THE COUP WHICH WAS CONTEMPLATED BEFORE THE MILITARY MEETING. NONETHELESS, WE DO NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY THAT BANZER MAY STILL MAKE SOME EFFORT TO ALTER THE ELECTION PROCESS.

2. THE MILITARY'S REAFFIRMATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION PROCESS ALSO TRIGGERED A FLURRY OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY. MOST NOTABLY, THE CANDIDACY OF FORMER PRESIDENT HERNAN SILES ZUAZO WAS FORMALLY LAUNCHED, "TOPATER" SIGNATORY RETIRED ARMY COLONEL JOSE PATINO AYAROA CONFIRMED HIS READINESS TO ENTER THE RACE, AND MODERATE ELEMENTS OF THE FSB SPLIT WITH THEIR MORE RIGHT-WING COLLEAGUES AND SIGNED ON WITH PEREDA. THE ARMED FORCES DECISION AND BANZER'S WITHDRAWAL OF FINANCIAL SUPPORT FROM PEREDA HAS SET THE STAGE FOR A MORE WIDE-OPEN ELECTION CAMPAIGN. THIS PROVIDES STRONG MOTIVATION FOR THE CIVILIAN PARTIES, HERETOFORE IN A FRACTURED STATE, TO GET ORGANIZED TO PRESENT A VIABLE OPPOSITION TO PEREDA. END SUMMARY.

3. IN ATTEMPTING TO RECONSTRUCT EVENTS LEADING UP TO AND SURROUNDING THE APRIL 3-5 MEETING OF ARMED FORCES COMMANDERS, WE HAVE LEARNED THAT THERE WAS INDEED SUBSTANCE BEHIND THE COUP RUMORS THAT SWEEPED LA PAZ DURING THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH. WE HAVE BEEN TOLD BY A WELL-PLACED MILITARY SOURCE WHO HAS BEEN RELIABLE IN THE PAST THAT KEY ELEMENTS OF THE THREE ARMED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 02987 01 OF 03 141216Z

SERVICES, PREOCCUPIED WITH PRESIDENT BANZER'S MACHINATIONS TO PERPETUATE HIMSELF IN POWER, HAD COORDINATED A PLAN TO TOPPLE HIM AND INSTALL PEREDA IN HIS PLACE. PEREDA APPARENTLY DID NOT LEARN OF THE PLAN UNTIL HE CONSULTED WITH AIR FORCE OFFICERS ON MARCH 29, THE DAY AFTER BANZER MADE AN UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE PEREDA TO WITHDRAW HIS CANDIDACY AND AGREE TO ELECTION POSTPONEMENT. WHILE HE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE COUP PLANS, PEREDA ALLEGEDLY COUNSELED THE OFFICERS TO HOLD OFF AT LEAST UNTIL AFTER THE MILITARY COMMANDERS' MEETING SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 3-5. WE FURTHER UNDERSTAND THAT BANZER, APPARENTLY HAVING GOTTEN WIND OF THE PLOTTING, PAID 50,000 PESOS TO EACH OF THE SIX KEY TROOP COMMANDERS IN THE LA PAZ AREA TO ENSURE THEIR LOYALTY.

4. PRIOR TO THE COMMANDERS' MEETING, WE ARE TOLD, BANZER CALLED IN THE THREE SERVICE CHIEFS AND INFORMED THEM THAT BECAUSE OF PEREDA'S FALTERING CANDIDACY (BANZER HAD CUT OFF PEREDA'S CAMPAIGN FUNDS BY THAT POINT), THE THREAT THAT RENE BERNAL'S CANDIDACY WOULD SPLIT THE MILITARY, AND LOOMING ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE ARMED FORCES SHOULD COME UP WITH RECOMMENDATIONS THAT WOULD FAVOR POSTPONEMENT OR CANCELLATION OF ELECTIONS. BANZER SAID THAT HE WOULD OPEN THE MEETING,

BUT THEN WOULD LEAVE AND NOT RETURN UNTIL THE CLOSING CEREMONIES. ON APRIL 3, THE FIRST DAY OF THE MEETING, THE APPROXIMATELY 150 PARTICIPANTS DIVIDED UP BY SERVICE TO CONSIDER THE ISSUES. CONSISTENT WITH BANZER'S INSTRUCTIONS, THE ARMY, AIR FORCE AND NAVY CHIEFS TOLD THEIR MEN TO LOOK TO THE POSSIBILITY OF ALTERING THE ELECTORAL PROCESS. HEATED DEBATE ENSUED. WHILE MOST OF THE FLAG OFFICERS FAVORED THE BANZER PROPOSAL, THE COLONELS AND LIEUTENANT COLONELS, WHO OUTNUMBER THEM GREATLY, WERE OVERWHELMINGLY OPPOSED TO IT. WHAT EVOLVED, THEREFORE, WERE RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAINTAIN THE ELECTORAL TIMETABLE AND TO STRENGTHEN THE PEREDA CANDIDACY. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THESE RECOMMENDATIONS WERE CARRIED BY ABOUT AN 80 PCT MAJORITY VOTE. NOTABLE HOLD-OUTS WERE OFFICERS FROM THE ARMY'S FIRST AND FIFTH DIVISIONS (THE FORMER HEADQUARTERED IN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 02987 01 OF 03 141216Z

THE LA PAZ AREA) WHO VOTED TO POSTPONE ELECTIONS.

5. IN AN EFFORT TO REFURBISH THE GOVERNMENT'S IMAGE AND STRENGTHEN THE PEREDA CANDIDACY, THE MILITARY COMMANDERS ALSO MADE SEVERAL UNPUBLISHED RECOMMENDATIONS. THESE INCLUDED THE IMMEDIATE REPLACEMENT OF PEREDA ADVISERS EDWIN TAPIA,

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 02987 02 OF 03 141228Z
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-05 H-01 INR-10 L-03
NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02 SS-15 ICA-11 TRSE-00
HA-05 AID-05 OMB-01 ACDA-12 /091 W
-----011403 141314Z /10

P R 132140Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 349
INFO AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
DIA WASHDC
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 2 OF 3 LA PAZ 2987

JAVIER ACRC, AND BANZER ADVISER ALFREDO ARCE. TAPIA HAS BEEN TARNISHED, PERHAPS UNJUSTLY, BY A NARCOTICS SCANDAL; JAVIER ARCE IS WIDELY KNOWN AS A POLITICAL MANIPULATOR; AND ALFREDO ARCE, WHILE INTERIOR MINISTER, MAY HAVE BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF ARMY COLONEL ANDRES SELICH. SECONDLY, BANZER WAS ADVISED TO CHANGE A NUMBER OF PREFECTS, MAYORS AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS TO ENSURE THAT THESE SLOTS, PARTICULARLY KEY IN AN ELECTION PERIOD, WERE FILLED BY PERSONS WELL DISPOSED TOWARD PEREDA.

6. ALARMED AT HOW EVENTS WERE UNFOLDING, BANZER RETURNED TO THE MEETING ON APRIL 4, A DAY EARLIER THAN PLANNED, TO TRY TO SALVAGE HIS POSITION. HOWEVER, CONFRONTED BY THE REALITY THAT THE MILITARY WOULD NOT ACCEPT A CHANGE IN THE ELECTORAL TIME-TABLE, BANZER REVERSED HIMSELF, EVEN GOING SO FAR AS TO REQUEST THAT THE SUPPORT FOR PEREDA BE SUBSTANTIAL, NOT "LYRICAL." ALTHOUGH BY SOME ACCOUNTS HE DEFENDED TAPIA AND THE TWO ARCES, HE APPARENTLY AGREED TO REPLACE A NUMBER OF PREFECTS, MAYORS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WITH PERSONS RECOMMENDED BY THE MILITARY. WHILE THE EXACT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IS NOT ENTIRELY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 02987 02 OF 03 141228Z

CLEAR, BY WEDNESDAY MORNING THE MILITARY HAD AGREED UPON A PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT FAVORING JULY ELECTIONS (REPORTED REFTTEL) AND A RESERVED DOCUMENT CONTAINING THREE RECOMMENDATIONS: SUPPORT FOR PEREDA'S CAMPAIGN; CHANGES IN THE BANZER/PEREDA ADVISERS; AND CHANGES IN PREFECTS, MAYORS, ETC. BY ONE ACCOUNT PEREDA WAS ALSO TO BE ALLOWED TO NAME NEW MINISTERS OF INTERIOR, LABOR AND AGRICULTURE, BUT WE HAVE NOT VERIFIED THIS.

7. WHAT CAUSED THE MILITARY'S REBUFF TO BANZER. MORE THAN ANYTHING ELSE, IT APPEARS THAT THE MILITARY HAVE BECOME FED UP WITH BANZER AND WISH TO GET RID OF HIM VIA ELECTIONS. OTHER FACTORS NO DOUBT PLAYED A ROLE, INCLUDING THE STATEMENTS OF THE WESTERN AMBASSADORS IN SUPPORT OF RETURN TO DEMOCRACY.

8. WHY THE APPARENT COALESCING OF MILITARY SUPPORT BEHIND PEREDA? SEVERAL KEY OFFICERS MADE PLAIN, THAT MUCH OF THE ARMY OPPOSITION TO PEREDA REFLECTED IN FACT OPPOSITION TO BANZER'S CONTINUATION IN POWER WITH PEREDA AS HIS PUPPET PRESIDENT. THE WIDENING SPLIT BETWEEN PEREDA AND BANZER APPARENTLY CONVINCED THE MILITARY THAT PEREDA'S CANDIDACY WAS NOT SIMPLY CONTINUATION OF BANZER-ISM IN ANOTHER FORM. THE ENHANCEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR PEREDA ALSO SIGNIFIED THAT THE ARMED FORCES STILL WISH TO PLAY A DETERMINING ROLE IN WHO GOVERNS BOLIVIA, AND ARE NOT YET READY TO REMAIN COMPLETELY NEUTRAL DURING THE ELECTION PROCESS.

9. DESPITE HIS OUTWARD ACQUIESCENCE IN THE MILITARY'S

DECISION, THERE IS GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE THAT BANZER MAY CONTINUE TO TRY TO SHELVE THE JULY 9 ELECTION DATE. BANZER'S PERSONAL FRIENDS, WHO HAVE SUBSTANTIAL BUSINESS CONNECTIONS AND TO WHOM HE IS BEHOLDEN, REMAIN OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF ELECTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT. SUPPORT FOR THE THEORY THAT BANZER HAS NOT RECONCILED HIMSELF TO JULY ELECTIONS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 LA PAZ 02987 02 OF 03 141228Z

MAY BE FOUND IN (1) HIS REFUSAL TO FREE UP GOVERNMENT FUNDS FOR THE PEREDA COANDIDACY AND (2) HIS FAILURE THUS FAR TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON HIS AGREEMENT TO REPLACE THE PREFECTS AND MAYORS FINGERED BY THE MILITARY. AT AN AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE MEETING ON APRIL 7, PEREDA HIMSELF TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT HE FEARED BANZER WOULD STILL TRY TO THROW A WRENCH INTO THE ELECTORAL PROCESS, AND PEREDA HAS INDICATED THIS TO SEVERAL OTHER INTIMATES.

10. ALTHOUGH HIS MAEUVERING SPACE HAS BEEN CUT DOWN CONSIDERABLY BY THE MILITARY'S REAFFIRMATION OF ELECTIONS ON JULY 9, MANY BELIEVE BANZER TO BE MOST DANGEROUS WHEN BOXED IN. IF BANZER WERE TO MAKE ANOTHER ATTEMPT TO DERAIL THE PROCESS, IT WOULD INEVITABLY BE A HIGH-RISK UNDERTAKING. HAVING MADE ITS VIEWS CLEAR, THE MAJORITY OF THE MILITARY WOULD NOT LOOK KINDLY ON SUCH AN ATTEMPT, AND MIGHT WELL FEEL PROMPTED TO IMPLEMENT THE COUP THAT WAS CONTEMPLATED IN LATE MARCH. SEVERAL MILITARY SOURCES HAVE TOLD US THAT IF BANZER NOW TRIES TO POSTPONE ELECTIONS, THE MILITARY WILL TAKE STEPS TO OUST HIM.

11. IN THE WAKE OF THE MILITARY'S PRO-ELECTION DECISION, THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL DEVELOPMENTS ON THE CIVILIAN FRONT WHICH WILL ALSO HAVE A SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON WHAT HAPPENS BETWEEN NOW AND JULY.

12. ON APRIL 9, THE ANNIVERSARY DATE OF THE 1952 REVOLUTION, THE CANDIDACY OF FORMER PRESIDENT HERNAN SILES ZUAZO WAS PROCLAIMED AT A CONVENTION ORGANIZED BY HIS MNRI PARTY. PLEDGING TO SUPPORT SILES WERE THE LEFT-WING MIR, THE SOCIALISTS OF GUILLERMO APONTE AND THE MOSCOW-LINE COMMUNISTS. IN HIS ACCEPTANCE SPEECH, SILES EXTOLLED HIS ERSTWHILE RESOLUTIONARY COLLEAGUES VICTOR PAZ ESTENSSORO (MRN), WALTER GUEVARA ARZE (PRA) AND JUAN LECHIN OQUENDO (PRIN), AND CALLED FOR THE REUNIFICATION OF THE OLD MNR IN A NEW ELECTORAL FRONT. AFTER SHARPLY CRITICIZING THE BANZER GOVERNMENT, SILES
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 LA PAZ 02987 02 OF 03 141228Z

DECLARED THAT IF ELECTORAL VICTORY WERE STOLEN FROM HIM BY FRAUD, HIS BACKERS "WOULD TAKE UP ARMS" TO GAIN THEIR RIGHTS.

13. FOLLOWING THE MNRI CONVENTION, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE "HISTORICAL" WING OF THE MRN SAID THAT NO ACTION COULD BE TAKEN ON SILES' CALL FOR A NEW ELECTORAL FRONT UNTIL PAZ ESTENSSORO RETURNED; THIS ALSO WAS THE STATED POSITION OF GUEVARA ARZE. LECHIN OQUENDO, JUST BACK FROM A TRIP TO CARACAS, HOWEVER, TERMED THE SILES IDEA "INFANTILE". LECHIN SAID THAT THE PRIN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY WAS DIRECTLY OPPOSED TO THAT OF THE MNRI, AND THAT SUCH REUNIFICATION WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE. LECHIN ADDED THAT HE WOULD NOT BE A CANDIDATE FOR THE PRESIDENCY, THE SENATE OR THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, AND THAT HIS ONLY INTEREST LAY IN DEFENDING WORKERS' RIGHTS.

14. WHILE ACTIVITY IN THE BERNAL CAMPAIGN--WHICH GOT OFF TO A STRONG START IN THE ORURO AREA--SEEMS TO HAVE SLACKENED RECENTLY, ANOTHER FORMER MILITARY OFFICER, JOSE PATINO AYAROA, HAS PUBLICLY CONFIRMED RUMORS THAT HE IS WILLING TO ENTER THE RACE FOR THE PRESIDENCY. PATINO, WHO SIGNED THE CONTROVERSIAL "TOPATER" LETTER (WHICH CALLED FOR THE MILITARY TO WITHDRAW FROM GOVERNMENT AND RETURN TO THE BARRACKS), TOLD REPORTERS ON APRIL 10 THAT HE HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY A NUMBER OF POLITICAL GROUPS AND WOULD PROBABLY BE PROCLAIMED SHORTLY. ALTHOUGH HE DECLINED TO STATE PUBLICLY WHO WOULD BACK HIM, PATINO

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 LA PAZ 02987 03 OF 03 141302Z
ACTION ARA-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 TRSE-00 HA-05 AID-05 CIAE-00 PM-05
H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 OMB-01 ACDA-12 /091 W
-----012010 141315Z /42

P R 132140Z APR 78
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 350
INFO AMEMBASSY LIMA
AMEMBASSY QUITO
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO
DIA WASHDC
USCINCSO J2 QUARRY HEIGHTS CZ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 3 LA PAZ 2987

ADVISED US HE HOPES TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF MODERATE LEFT FORCES SUCH AS THE MRN-PAZ GROUP AND THE PRA OF WALTER GUEVARA, BUT HE INDICATED THAT HE HAS NOT ARRIVED AT ANY UNDERSTANDING WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS.

15. PEREDA'S OWN CANDIDACY TOOK ON ADDED SIGNS OF LIFE WHEN FSB MODERATE GASTON MOREIRA SIGNED AN AGREEMENT APRIL 7 PLEDGING HIS PARTY'S UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT. MOREIRA'S ACTIONS, HOWEVER, WERE IMMEDIATELY REPUDICATED BY FSB LEADER AND MANZER INTIMATE MARIO GUTIERREZ. CHARACTERIZING THE PLEDGE TO BACK PEREDA AS A "POLITICAL FELONY", GUTIERREZ ISSUED A DOCUMENT EXPELLING MOREIRA AND THREE OF HIS COLLEAGUES FROM THE PARTY "IGNOMINIOUSLY, FOR HIGH TREASON." THE ONCE-SOLID FSB THEN BEGAN TO SPLIT ALONG PREDICTABLE LINES, WITH MODERATES AND GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRATS SUPPORTING MOREIRA (PEREDA), AND MILITANT RIGHT-WINGERS FALLING IN BEHIND GUTIERREZ.

16. ALTHOUGH PEREDA'S SELF CONFIDENCE HAS INCREASED NOTICEABLY IN RECENT DAYS, HIS CANDIDACY STILL HAS CONSIDERABLE PROBLEMS. CUT OFF FROM GOVERNMENT FUNDS, IT HAS BEEN SQUEEZED
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 LA PAZ 02987 03 OF 03 141302Z

FINANCIALLY. AFTER THE MILITARY'S DECISION, HOWEVER, WE UNDERSTAND THAT SOME PRIVATE DONATIONS HAVE BEGUN TO COME IN. PRESENTING A MORE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY FOR PEREDA IS THE MILITARY'S RECOMMENDATION TO REPLACE HIS TOP ADVISERS EDWIN TAPIA AND JAVIER ARCE. IF THESE AIDES ARE FORCED TO WITHDRAW FROM HIS CAMPAIGN, PEREDA WILL LOSE HIS TWO MOST TRUSTED ADVISORS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THEY STAY WITH HIM, PEREDA RISKS DIMINISHING SOME OF HIS MILITARY SUPPORT.

17. CONCLUSION. POLITICAL EVENTS IN BOLIVIA DO NOT TEND TO FALL INTO LOGICAL PATTERNS, AND THIS HAS BEEN ESPECIALLY TRUE IN THE PAST FEW WEEKS. NONETHELESS, CERTAIN NEW TRENDS HAVE BECOME EVIDENT. (1) THE MILITARY HAS SPOKEN UNEQUIVOCALLY IN FAVOR OF HOLDING ELECTIONS ON JULY 9 AND RETURNING BOLIVIA TO CIVILIAN RULE. (2) THE MILITARY HAS ALSO FINALLY WARMED TO THE PEREDA CANDIDACY, PERHAPS PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE PEREDA IS NOW VIEWED AS A CLEAR ALTERNATIVE TO BANZER, RATHER THAN A SURROGATE FOR HIM. (3) PEREDA'S ELECTION NO LONGER SEEMS ASSURED AND THE PROSPECTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC FREE-FOR-ALL HAVE BEEN HEIGHTENED. (4) BANZER HAS SUFFERED A SHARP DECLINE IN POWER AND PRESTIGE, BUT HE IS STILL CAPABLE OF TRYING TO DISRUPT THE ELECTION PROCESS. UNLESS HE DOES MANAGE TO DO THIS, HE IS CERTAINLY ENTERING THE TWILIGHT OF HIS SEVEN-YEAR REIGN. BANZER DOES STILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PUT THE BEST FACE ON DEFEAT BY LEAPING AGAIN TO THE FRONT OF FORCES MOVING BOLIVIA TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.
BOEKER

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ARMED FORCES, POLICIES, DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL MILITARY RELATIONS, ELECTIONS, ELECTION CANCELLATION, POLITICAL SITUATION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 13 apr 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978LAPAZ02987
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780160-0988
Format: TEL
From: LA PAZ
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780459/aaaabyax.tel
Line Count: 386
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: eb61a1b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION ARA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 LA PAZ 2753
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 jul 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2974616
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BOLIVIAN ARMED FORCES DECISION OF APRIL 5 A MAJOR STEP TOWARDS JULY ELECTIONS: SETS OFF A FLURRY OF POLITICAL ACTIVITY
TAGS: PGOV, PINT, BL
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/eb61a1b0-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

